

# Engineering Economic Analysis

Fall 2019

## Mid-term Exam Solution

2019.04.30

**Q.1.)**

(a)

The problem can be formulated as the utility maximization problem like below.

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \ln x_0 + \beta(\delta \ln x_1 + \delta^2 \ln x_2) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & (1+r)(x_0 + x_1) + x_2 = w \end{aligned}$$

Lagrangian:

$$L = \ln x_0 + \beta(\delta \ln x_1 + \delta^2 \ln x_2) - \lambda((1+r)(x_0 + x_1) + x_2 - w)$$

First order condition:

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial x_0} = \frac{1}{x_0} - \lambda(1+r) = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial x_1} = \frac{\beta\delta}{x_1} - \lambda(1+r) = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial x_2} = \frac{\beta\delta^2}{x_2} - \lambda = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} = (1+r)(x_0 + x_1) + x_2 - w = 0$$

Solving equations of F.O.C., we get

$$x_0^* = \frac{w}{(1+r)(1+\beta\delta+\beta\delta^2)}, \quad x_1^* = \frac{\beta\delta w}{(1+r)(1+\beta\delta+\beta\delta^2)}, \quad x_2^* = \frac{\beta\delta^2 w}{1+\beta\delta+\beta\delta^2}$$

(b) False!

Let the total amount of debt, which depends on  $\beta$ , as  $D(\beta)$ . Then,

$$D(\beta) = x_0^*(\beta) + x_1^*(\beta) = \frac{w + \beta\delta w}{(1+r)(1 + \beta\delta + \beta\delta^2)}$$

**(Approach 1 - Comparative statics)**

Comparative statics with respect to  $\beta$  can be calculated as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{D(\beta)}{d\beta} &= \frac{\delta w \{(1+r)(1 + \beta\delta + \beta\delta^2)\} - (w + \beta\delta w) \{(1+r)(\delta + \delta^2)\}}{(1+r)^2 (1 + \beta\delta + \beta\delta^2)^2} \\ &= \frac{w(1+r) \{\delta(1 + \beta\delta + \beta\delta^2) - (1 + \beta\delta)(\delta + \delta^2)\}}{(1+r)^2 (1 + \beta\delta + \beta\delta^2)^2} \\ &= -\frac{w(1+r)\delta^2}{(1+r)^2 (1 + \beta\delta + \beta\delta^2)^2} < 0 \quad (\because w \geq 0, r \geq 0) \end{aligned}$$

So, if the present bias becomes bigger, the total amount of debt becomes smaller. Therefore, the consumer with *present-bias* ( $\beta < 1$ ) borrow more debt than the consumer without *present-bias* ( $\beta = 1$ ).

**(Approach 2 - Direct comparison)**

$$\begin{aligned} D(1) - D(\beta) &= \frac{w + \delta w}{(1+r)(1 + \delta + \delta^2)} - \frac{w + \beta\delta w}{(1+r)(1 + \beta\delta + \beta\delta^2)} \\ &= \frac{w(\beta - 1)(\delta + \delta^2)}{(1+r)(1 + \delta + \delta^2)(1 + \beta\delta + \beta\delta^2)} < 0 \quad (\because \beta < 1) \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the consumer with *present-bias* borrow more debt than the consumer without *present-bias*.


**Q.2.)**

The problem can be formulated as the utility maximization problem like below.

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & x_1^2 + x_2^2 \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 = m \end{aligned}$$


Since the utility function is convex, the solution will be at the corner (corner solutions).

**(Case 1)**  $p_1 < p_2$ :



$$x_1^* = \frac{m}{p_1}, x_2^* = 0$$

**(Case 2)**  $p_2 < p_1$ :




$$x_1^* = 0, x_2^* = \frac{m}{p_2}$$

**(Case 3)**  $p_1 = p_2$ :

$$(x_1^*, x_2^*) = \left(\frac{m}{p_1}, 0\right) \text{ or } \left(0, \frac{m}{p_2}\right)$$

Therefore, quantity changes of good 1 with respect to its own price can be depicted like below.



As price becomes higher, the optimal amount of good 1 becomes smaller, if the price of good 1 is cheaper than that of good 2. If the price of good 1 is more expensive than that of good 2, the optimal amount does not change at the level of 0.

**Q.3.)**

(a)

The problem can be formulated as

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & 2x_1^\alpha + x_2 \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & p_1x_1 + p_2x_2 = m \end{aligned}$$

Since the utility function is quasi-linear, we can rewrite the problem as

$$\max \quad 2x_1^\alpha + \frac{1}{p_2}(m - p_1x_1)$$

The optimal solution (Marshallian demand function) can be obtained from F.O.C.

$$\frac{du}{dx_1} = 2\alpha x_1^{\alpha-1} - \frac{p_1}{p_2} = 0$$

Therefore, the Marshallian demand functions can be written as

$$x_1^* = \left(\frac{1}{2\alpha}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}} \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}}, \quad x_2^* = \frac{m}{p_2} - \left(\frac{1}{2\alpha}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}} \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}$$

(b)

The indirect utility function can be calculated as

$$v(p_1, p_2, m) = \frac{m}{p_2} - \left(\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}\right) \left(\frac{1}{2\alpha}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}} \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}$$

Then, expenditure function is

$$e(p_1, p_2, u) = p_2 \left[ u + \left(\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}\right) \left(\frac{1}{2\alpha}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}} \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} \right]$$

Therefore, the Hicksian demand functions are obtained as

$$h_1^* = \frac{\partial e}{\partial p_1} = \left(\frac{p_1}{2\alpha p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}}$$
$$h_2^* = \frac{\partial e}{\partial p_2} = u - 2 \left(\frac{p_1}{2\alpha p_2}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}$$

(c)

Let  $m = 10$ ,  $p_1 = p_2 = 2$ ,  $\alpha = 0.5$ . The optimal bundles  $(x_1^*, x_2^*) = (1, 4)$ , with the utility level of 6.

If price changes to  $p_1 = 1$ , The optimal bundles  $(x_1^*, x_2^*) = (4, 2)$ , with the utility level of 7. If

the consumer want to purchase  $(x_1, x_2) = (1, 4)$  after the price changes, he only pay \$8 to feel the same utility before the price changed.

$$\therefore \text{Consumer Surplus} = 10 - 8 = 2$$

Compensating variations can be calculated as follows.

$$CV = e(1, 2, 7) - e(1, 2, 6) = 2$$

Equivalent variations can be calculated as follows.

$$EV = e(2, 2, 7) - e(2, 2, 6) = 2$$

#### Q.4.)

(a)

- Type-A (100 consumers) have the problem as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \min\{x, 2y\} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & p_1x + p_2y = m = 3,600 \end{aligned}$$

Solving it, the optimal solution can be obtained as

$$x^* = \frac{2m}{2p_1 + p_2} = \frac{7,200}{2p_1 + p_2}, \quad y^* = \frac{m}{2p_1 + p_2} = \frac{3,600}{2p_1 + p_2}$$

- Type-B (200 consumers) have the problem as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sqrt{xy} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & p_1x_1 + p_2y = m = 3,600 \end{aligned}$$

Solving it, the optimal solution can be obtained as

$$x^* = \frac{m}{2p_1} = \frac{1,800}{p_1}, \quad y^* = \frac{m}{2p_2} = \frac{1,800}{p_2}$$

Therefore, the market demand function for good  $x$  can be calculated as

$$D_x = 100 * \left( \frac{7,200}{2p_1 + p_2} \right) + 200 * \left( \frac{1,800}{p_1} \right) = 720,000 \left( \frac{4p_1 + p_2}{4p_1^2 + 2p_1p_2} \right)$$

(b) True!

Price elasticity can be calculated as

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon &= \frac{d \ln D_x}{d \ln p_1} = \frac{d \ln D_x}{dp_1} \cdot \frac{dp_1}{d \ln p_1} = \frac{d \ln D_x}{dp_1} \cdot \frac{1}{\frac{d \ln p_1}{dp_1}} = \frac{d \ln D_x}{dp_1} \cdot p_1 \\ &= p_1 \frac{d}{dp_1} \left\{ \ln(4p_1 + p_2) - \ln(4p_1^2 + 2p_1p_2) \right\} \\ &= p_1 \left[ \left( \frac{4}{4p_1 + p_2} \right) - \left( \frac{8p_1 + 2p_2}{4p_1^2 + 2p_1p_2} \right) \right] \\ &= -\frac{8p_1^2 + 4p_1p_2 + p_2^2}{8p_1^2 + 6p_1p_2 + p_2^2} = \frac{41}{45} \end{aligned}$$

It means good  $x$  is inelastic with respect to its own price, since  $|\varepsilon| < 1$ . So, the revenue will increase if a producer of good  $x$  raises the price of good  $x$ .

(c)

If the price of good  $x = \$20$  and that of  $y = \$10$ :

- type-A will purchase (144, 72), and the utility level is 144.

- type-B will purchase (90, 180), and the utility level is  $90\sqrt{2}$ .

If the price of good  $x$  becomes  $\$10$ , and lump-sum tax as  $t$

**(Type A)**

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \min \{x, 2y\} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & 10x + 10y = 3,600 - t \end{aligned}$$

the optimal solution can be obtained as

$$x^* = \frac{7,200 - 2t}{30} = 240 - \frac{2}{30}t, \quad y^* = \frac{3,600 - t}{30} = 120 - \frac{1}{30}t$$

His utility level is  $240 - \frac{2}{30}t$ , thus he would pay lump-sum tax if  $240 - \frac{2}{30}t \geq 144$ .

$$\therefore t \leq 1,440$$

**(Type B)**

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sqrt{xy} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & 10x_1 + 10y = 3,600 - t \end{aligned}$$

the optimal solution can be obtained as

$$x^* = \frac{3,600 - t}{20} = 180 - \frac{1}{20}t, \quad y^* = 180 - \frac{1}{20}t$$

His utility level is  $180 - \frac{1}{20}t$ , thus he would pay lump-sum tax if  $180 - \frac{1}{20}t \geq 90\sqrt{2}$ .

$$\therefore t \leq 1800(2 - \sqrt{2})$$

Type A  $\Rightarrow$  1440, Type B  $\Rightarrow$   $1800(2 - \sqrt{2})$

This is the same value of compensating variations.

(cf.) EV

- EV of type A

If price of A =  $\$10$ , price of B =  $\$10$ , the utility is 240 with the optimal bundle of (240, 120).

Therefore,  $EV = 20 \cdot 240 + 10 \cdot 120 - 3,600 = 2,400$ .

- EV of type B

If price of A = \$10, price of B = \$10, the utility is 180 with the optimal bundle of (180, 180).

To feel same utility level when price of A = \$20, price of B = \$10,  $\frac{m}{20\sqrt{2}} = 180$  should hold.

Therefore,  $EV = 3600(\sqrt{2} - 1)$