

457.646 Topics in Structural Reliability
In-Class Material: Class 15

※ **FERUM Example (SORM)**

$$g(\mathbf{x}) = 1 - \frac{m_1}{s_1 y} - \frac{m_2}{s_2 y} - \left(\frac{P}{Ay} \right)^2 \leq 0$$

$$\beta_{FORM} = 2.4661$$

(Curvature fitting)


$$\kappa_i \begin{cases} -1.548 \times 10^{-1} \\ -3.997 \times 10^{-2} \\ 8.903 \times 10^{-7} \end{cases}$$

$$\beta_{SORM} = 2.3506(T), 2.3596(B), 2.341(iB)$$

(Point fitting)

+	-
$a_i \begin{cases} -6.2969 \times 10^{-2} \\ -1.1986 \times 10^{-2} \\ -1.3778 \times 10^{-1} \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} -4.0358 \times 10^{-2} \\ -9.7461 \times 10^{-3} \\ -1.1050 \times 10^{-1} \end{cases}$

$$\beta_{SORM} = 2.3599(T), 2.3693(B), 2.3537(iB)$$



See supplement, "Importance and Sensitivity Vectors" (by A. Der Kiureghian)

➔ Main reference: Bjerager & Krenk (1989)

◎ **FORM importance vector $\hat{\mathbf{u}}$**

FORM approximation of the limit-state function


$$G(\mathbf{u}) \cong G(\mathbf{u}^*) + \nabla G(\mathbf{u}^*)(\mathbf{u} - \mathbf{u}^*)$$

=

$$= (\beta - \hat{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}\mathbf{u})$$

$$G'(\mathbf{u}) = \frac{G(\mathbf{u})^{FO}}{\|\nabla G(\mathbf{u}^*)\|} =$$

Note $\sigma_{G'}^2 = (\quad) \Sigma_{\mathbf{u}} (\quad)$
 $= \hat{\boldsymbol{\alpha}} \hat{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}^T = \hat{\boldsymbol{\alpha}} \hat{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}^T = \boxed{\quad} =$



Contribution (percentage) of u_i
 to the total (variability)
 of the limit-state function $G'(\mathbf{u})$

① **Magnitude** of $\alpha_i^2 \Rightarrow$ measure of relative importance (contribution to the uncertainty) of u_i 's

② **Sign** of $\alpha_i \Rightarrow$ nature of u_i 's e.g., $g(\mathbf{X}) = R - S$

$$G'(\mathbf{u}) = \beta - \hat{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}\mathbf{u} = \beta -$$

$$\begin{cases} \alpha_i \text{ positive} \Rightarrow u_i \text{ capacity or demand} \\ \alpha_i \text{ negative} \Rightarrow u_i \text{ capacity or demand} \end{cases}$$

Question) Importance of $u_i \stackrel{?}{=} \text{Importance of } X_i$

i) Independent: $u_i = \Phi^{-1}[F_{X_i}(x_i)]$ OK


ii) Dependent: e.g., Nataf NOT OK

$$\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{L}_0^{-1}\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{L}_0^{-1} \begin{Bmatrix} \Phi^{-1}[F_{X_1}(x_1)] \\ \vdots \\ \Phi^{-1}[F_{X_n}(x_n)] \end{Bmatrix}$$

$\therefore \hat{\alpha}_i$ does NOT $\left(\begin{array}{l} \text{Measure importance} \\ \text{Indicate the nature} \end{array} \right)$ of x_i 's

when X_i 's are .

© Form importance vector $\hat{\gamma}$ (Question: contribution/nature of x_i ? Not u_i 's)



Transform to "normal equivalent" of \mathbf{x}

Why? Want to keep () distribution

Want to recover ()

$\mathbf{u}^{FO}(\mathbf{x})$?

$$\begin{cases} \mathbf{u} = \mathbf{u}(\mathbf{x}^*) + J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}} - \mathbf{x}^*) \\ \hat{\mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{x}^* + J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}^{-1}(\mathbf{u} - \mathbf{u}^*) \end{cases} \quad (*)$$

Note: Jacobians evaluated at $\mathbf{x} =$

$$\hat{\mathbf{X}} \sim N(\hat{\mathbf{M}}, \hat{\mathbf{\Sigma}})$$

$$\begin{cases} \hat{\mathbf{M}} = \\ \hat{\mathbf{\Sigma}} = \end{cases}$$

Substituting (*) into $G'(\mathbf{u}) = \beta - \hat{\mathbf{a}}\mathbf{u}$,

$$\begin{aligned} G'(\mathbf{u}) &= G'(\hat{\mathbf{x}}) = \beta - \hat{\mathbf{a}}[\mathbf{u}^* + J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}} - \mathbf{x}^*)] \\ &= \beta - \hat{\mathbf{a}}\mathbf{u}^* - \hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}} - \mathbf{x}^*) \\ &= -\hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}} - \mathbf{x}^*) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_{G''}^2 &= (-\hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}})\hat{\Sigma}(-J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}^T\hat{\mathbf{a}}^T) \\ &= \hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}^{-1}(J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}^{-1})^T J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}^T\hat{\mathbf{a}}^T \\ &= \|\hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}\hat{\Sigma}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}^T\| = \sum \|\hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}\hat{\Sigma}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}^T\| = \text{Contribution of each } \hat{x}_i? \end{aligned}$$

$$\hat{\Sigma} = \hat{\mathbf{D}}\hat{\mathbf{D}} + (\hat{\Sigma} - \hat{\mathbf{D}}\hat{\mathbf{D}})$$

diagonal off-diagonal

$$\sigma_{G''}^2 = \hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}(\hat{\mathbf{D}}\hat{\mathbf{D}})J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}^T\hat{\mathbf{a}}^T + \hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}(\hat{\Sigma} - \hat{\mathbf{D}}\hat{\mathbf{D}})J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}^T\hat{\mathbf{a}}^T = 1$$

Contribution from variances $\sigma_{\hat{x}_i}^2$ Contribution from covariances $COV[\hat{x}_i, \hat{x}_j]$

Then, how about using $\hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}\hat{\mathbf{D}}$ instead of $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$?

But not normalized yet.

$$\therefore \hat{\gamma} = \frac{\hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}\hat{\mathbf{D}}}{\|\hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}\hat{\mathbf{D}}\|}$$

i) Magnitude of $\hat{\gamma}_i^2 \rightarrow$ contribution (importance) of \hat{x}_i or x_i

ii) Sign of $\hat{\gamma}_i \rightarrow$ nature of \hat{x}_i or x_i

Note : $G''(\hat{\mathbf{x}}) = -\hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}} - \mathbf{x}^*)$

$\hat{\gamma}_i$ positive \rightarrow _____ type r.v x_i

$\hat{\gamma}_i$ negative \rightarrow _____ type r.v x_i

Note : when \mathbf{x} are independent, $\hat{\mathbf{a}} = \hat{\gamma}$?

$$\hat{\Sigma} = (J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}^{-1})(J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}^{-1})^T = \hat{\mathbf{D}}\hat{\mathbf{D}} + (\hat{\Sigma} - \hat{\mathbf{D}}\hat{\mathbf{D}})$$

$$\hat{\mathbf{D}} =$$

$$\hat{\gamma} = \frac{\hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}\hat{\mathbf{D}}}{\|\hat{\mathbf{a}}J_{\mathbf{u},\mathbf{x}}\hat{\mathbf{D}}\|} =$$

※ FERUM Example ($\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ and $\hat{\gamma}$)

457.646 Topics in Structural Reliability

In-Class Material: Class 16

◎ FORM importance vectors: $\hat{\alpha}$, $\hat{\gamma}$

◎ Generalized Reliability Importance Measure (GRIM; Kim and Song, 2018)

See supplement "Generalized Reliability Importance Measure"

◎ FORM parameter sensitivities of β : $\frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \theta}$ (Bjerager & Krenk, 1989; See Supp)

θ { $\theta \in \theta_g$: parameters in $g(\mathbf{x}; \theta_g)$
 e.g. $g(\mathbf{x}; \theta_g) = 1 - \frac{M}{M_u} - \left(\frac{P}{P_u}\right)^2 \leq 0$ $\theta_g = \{M_u, P_u\}$
 $\theta \in \theta_f$: _____ parameters in $f_x(\mathbf{x}; \theta_f)$
 e.g. $\sigma, \mu, \rho, \lambda, \xi, b$

① Case $\theta \in \theta_f$ (distribution) ※ Derivations → see Supplement

$$\frac{d\beta}{d\theta} = \hat{\alpha} \frac{\partial \mathbf{u}(\mathbf{x}^*, \theta)}{\partial \theta}$$

Obtain $\hat{\alpha}$ by FORM analysis

Derive $\frac{\partial \mathbf{u}(\mathbf{x}, \theta)}{\partial \theta}$ from $\mathbf{u}(\mathbf{x}, \theta)$ and evaluate it at $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}^*$

⇒ Vector version $\nabla_{\theta_f} \beta = \hat{\alpha} J_{\mathbf{u}, \theta_f}(\mathbf{x}^*, \theta_f)$

e.g. $\mathbf{x} \sim$ s.i. Normal

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{u} &= \mathbf{L}^{-1} \mathbf{D}^{-1} (\mathbf{X} - \mathbf{M}) \\ &= \mathbf{D}^{-1} (\mathbf{X} - \mathbf{M}) \end{aligned}$$

$$u_1 = \quad , \quad u_2 = \quad \dots$$

$$\frac{\partial u_1}{\partial \sigma_1} = \quad \quad \quad \therefore \frac{\partial u_1}{\partial \sigma_1}(\mathbf{x}^*) =$$

② Case $\theta \in \theta_g$ (limit-state function)

$$\frac{d\beta}{d\theta} = \frac{1}{\|\nabla_{\mathbf{u}} G(\mathbf{u}^*, \theta)\|} \frac{\partial g(\mathbf{x}^*, \theta)}{\partial \theta}$$

↙ FORM ↙ derive from $g(\mathbf{x})$

⇒ Vector version

$$\nabla_{\theta_g} \beta = \frac{1}{\|\nabla_{\mathbf{u}} G(\mathbf{u}^*, \theta)\|} \nabla_{\theta_g} g(\mathbf{x}^*, \theta_g)$$

e.g.

$$g(\mathbf{x}, \theta_g) = 1 - \frac{M}{M_u} - \left(\frac{P}{P_u}\right)^2 \leq 0$$

θ_g

$$\frac{\partial g}{\partial \theta} = \quad \therefore \frac{\partial g}{\partial \theta}(\mathbf{x}^*) =$$

⊙ Parameter Sensitivities of failure probability $P_f : \frac{\partial P_f}{\partial \theta} ?$

Recall $P_f = \Phi(\quad)$

$$\frac{dP_f}{d\theta} =$$

Vector version:

$$\nabla_{\theta} P_f = -\phi(-\beta) \nabla_{\theta} \beta$$

⊙ Parameter sensitivities w.r.t. alternative parameters

$$\theta_f = \theta_f(\theta_{f'})$$

λ, ξ μ, σ

e.g.

$$\theta_f = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda \\ \xi \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \ln \mu - 0.5 \ln \left[1 + \left(\frac{\sigma}{\mu} \right)^2 \right] \\ \sqrt{\ln \left[1 + \left(\frac{\sigma}{\mu} \right)^2 \right]} \end{bmatrix}$$

$\theta_f(\theta_{f'})$ ← μ, σ

$$\nabla_{\theta_{f'}} \beta = \nabla_{\theta_f} \beta \cdot$$

% FERUM Input File for CRC CH14 Example (with Parameter)

```
clear probdata femodel analysisopt gfundata randomfield systems results
output_filename

output_filename = 'output_Ch14_Example_param.txt';

probdata.marg(1,:) = [ 1 2.5e5 2.5e5*0.3 2.5e5 0 0 0 0 0];
probdata.marg(2,:) = [ 1 1.25e5 1.25e5*0.3 1.25e5 0 0 0 0 0];
probdata.marg(3,:) = [15 2.5e6 2.5e6*0.2 2.5e6 0 0 0 0 0];
probdata.marg(4,:) = [16 4.0e7 4.0e7*0.1 4.0e7 0 0 0 0 0];

probdata.correlation = [1.0 0.5 0.3 0.0;
                        0.5 1.0 0.3 0.0;
                        0.3 0.3 1.0 0.0;
                        0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0];

probdata.parameter = distribution_parameter(probdata.marg);

analysisopt.ig_max = 100;
analysisopt.il_max = 5;
analysisopt.e1 = 0.001;
analysisopt.e2 = 0.001;
analysisopt.step_code = 0;
analysisopt.grad_flag = 'DDM';
analysisopt.sim_point = 'dspt';
analysisopt.stdv_sim = 1;
analysisopt.num_sim = 100000;
analysisopt.target_cov = 0.05;

gfundata(1).evaluator = 'basic';
gfundata(1).type = 'expression';
gfundata(1).parameter = 'yes'; % "We have a parameter in the limit-state
function"
gfundata(1).thetag = [0.03]; % default value of S1
gfundata(1).expression = '1-x(1)/gfundata(1).thetag(1)/x(4)-
x(2)/0.015/x(4)-(x(3)/0.190/x(4))^2';
gfundata(1).dgdq = { '-1/gfundata(1).thetag(1)/x(4)' ;
                    '-1/0.015/x(4)' ;
                    '-2*x(3)/0.190^2/x(4)^2' ;

                    'x(1)/gfundata(1).thetag(1)/x(4)^2+x(2)/0.015/x(4)^2+2*x(3)^2/0.190^2/x(4)
^3'};
gfundata(1).dgthetag = {'x(1)/x(4)/gfundata(1).thetag(1)^2'}; %
Derivative w.r.t. S1

femodel = 0;
randomfield.mesh = 0;
```

◎ Importance Vectors Using Parameter Sensitivities

⇒ Use $\nabla_M \beta$ and $\nabla_D \beta$ to quantify importance of random variables?

$$\frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \mu_1} \gg \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \mu_2} \rightarrow \text{more} \quad \text{to} \quad \text{than}$$

① Importance vector δ

$$\delta = \nabla_M \beta \cdot \mathbf{D}$$

$$= \left[\frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \mu_1}, \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \mu_2}, \dots, \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \mu_n} \right]$$

Why?

- X_i 's Can have different units & dimensions (therefore μ_i 's) ⇒ make it dimensionless
- Assume variations in $\mu_i \propto$
- Change in β when μ_i change by

② Importance vector η

$$\eta = \nabla_D \beta \cdot \mathbf{D}$$

$$= \left[\frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \sigma_1}, \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \sigma_2}, \dots, \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \sigma_n} \right]$$

Change in β when σ_i change by

③ Upgrade worth \mathbf{I}_θ

$$\mathbf{I}_\theta = -\nabla_\theta P_f \mathbf{D}_\theta$$

$$= \left[-\frac{\partial P_f}{\partial \theta_1}, \dots, -\frac{\partial P_f}{\partial \theta_n} \right]$$

$$\mathbf{D}_\theta = \left[\Delta \theta_i \right]$$

Change in θ_i that can be achieved by unit _____

- Der Kiureghian, Ditlevsen & Song (2007)
- Song & Kang (2009)

◎ Use of sensitivity / Importance Vectors

$$(\nabla_{\theta}\beta) \quad (\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\gamma}, \delta, \eta)$$

- ① To identify important rv's
- ② To update β for small increment

$$\beta_{new} \cong \beta_{old} + \sum_i \frac{\partial\beta}{\partial\theta_i} \cdot \Delta\theta_i$$

- ③ Reliability Based Design Optimization


$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial\beta}{\partial\theta}$ needed to facilitate the use of ()-based optimizers

- ④ To compute PDF of a function $y(\mathbf{x})$

$$\begin{aligned} F_Y(\theta) &= P(Y(\mathbf{x}) \leq \theta) \\ &= P(Y(\mathbf{x}) - \theta \leq 0) \quad \text{here consider } Y(\mathbf{x}) - \theta \text{ as the limit state function } g(\mathbf{x}, \theta) \\ &\cong \Phi(-\beta(\theta)) \end{aligned}$$

$$f_Y(\theta) = \frac{dF_Y(\theta)}{d\theta} = -\phi(-\beta(\theta)) \frac{d\beta}{d\theta}$$

- ⑤ To help gain insight of the reliability problem




IV. System Reliability

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System reliability?




Failure event	E_{sys}
Abnormal flight (engine)	$E_1 \cup E_2$
Emergency	$E_1 E_2$
Landing at nearby airport	$E_1 \bar{E}_2 \cup \bar{E}_1 E_2$

} $P(E_{sys})?$



System reliability in structural engineering

Lifeline networks




$$E_{system} = E_1 E_2 \cup E_4 E_5 \cup E_4 E_7 \cup E_4 E_9 \cup E_5 E_6 \cup E_6 E_7 \cup E_6 E_9 \cup E_5 E_8 \cup E_7 E_8 \cup E_8 E_9 \cup E_{11} E_{12} \cup E_1 E_3 E_5 \cup E_1 E_3 E_7 \cup E_1 E_3 E_9 \cup E_2 E_3 E_4 \cup E_2 E_3 E_6 \cup E_2 E_3 E_8 \cup E_4 E_{10} E_{12} \cup E_6 E_{10} E_{12} \cup E_8 E_{10} E_{12} \cup E_5 E_{10} E_{11} \cup E_7 E_{10} E_{11} \cup E_9 E_{10} E_{11} \cup E_1 E_3 E_{10} E_{12} \cup E_2 E_3 E_{10} E_{11}$$

Failure modes/paths



$$E_{system} = (E_1 \cap E_2) \cup (E_3 \cap E_4) \cup (E_3 \cap E_5)$$

Damage/loss aggregation




$$L_{system} = f(\mathbf{D}, \Theta)$$

$$E[L_{system}] \cong f(E[\mathbf{D}], E[\Theta])$$


$$\text{Var}[L_{system}] \cong \nabla f^T \Sigma \nabla f$$

$$P(L_{system} \geq c) \cong 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{c - E[L_{system}]}{\sqrt{\text{Var}[L_{system}]}}\right)$$

Outline



- I. System reliability: definitions, existing methods and challenges
- II. Bounds of system reliability by linear programming ('LP bounds')
- III. Matrix-based system reliability (MSR) method



I. System Reliability:



- definitions, existing methods and challenges

Definition of system: (1) series system

- System fails **if any** of its component events occur

$$E_{\text{system}} = \bigcup_{i=1}^n E_i$$

- Systems with no redundancy
- Examples: 1) statically determinate structure
2) electrical substation with single-transmission-line





Definition of system: (2) parallel system

- System fails **only if every** component event occurs

$$E_{\text{system}} = \bigcap_{i=1}^n E_i$$

- Systems with maximum redundancy
- Examples: 1) a bunch of wires or cables.
2) electrical substation with equipment items in parallel.

Song, J., and
A. Der Kiureghian
(2003, JEM
ASCE)



Definition of system: (3) general system

➤ System that is **neither series or parallel** system

1) Cut-set system:

- a series system of sub-parallel systems

$$E_{\text{system}} = \bigcup_{k=1}^K C_k = \bigcup_{k=1}^K \bigcap_{i \in C_k} E_i$$



2) Link-set system:

- a parallel system of sub-series systems

$$E_{\text{system}} = \bigcap_{l=1}^L L_l = \bigcap_{l=1}^L \bigcup_{i \in L_l} E_i$$

➤ Example: a structure with multiple failure paths (scenarios) ~ a cut-set system


Song, J., and
A. Der Kiureghian
(2003, JEM ASCE)




$$E_{\text{system}} = \underbrace{(E_1 \cap E_2)}_{\text{Scenario 1}} \cup \underbrace{(E_3 \cap E_4)}_{\text{Scenario 2}} \cup \underbrace{(E_3 \cap E_5)}_{\text{Scenario 3}}$$

* Component failure events and failure paths

(3) General system (contd.)




➤ Example: electrical substations (cut-set systems)



$$P(E_{system}) =$$

$$P[E_1 \cup (E_2 E_3 \cdots E_{k+1}) \cup E_{k+2} \cup E_{k+3} \cup E_{k+4}]$$

* 5 cut sets, k+4 components



$$P(E_{system}) =$$


$$P(E_1 E_2 \cup E_4 E_5 \cup E_4 E_7 \cup E_4 E_9 \cup E_5 E_6 \cup E_6 E_7 \cup E_6 E_9 \cup E_5 E_8 \cup E_7 E_8 \cup E_8 E_9 \cup E_{11} E_{12} \cup E_1 E_3 E_5 \cup E_1 E_3 E_7 \cup E_1 E_3 E_9 \cup E_2 E_3 E_4 \cup E_2 E_3 E_6 \cup E_2 E_3 E_8 \cup E_4 E_{10} E_{12} \cup E_6 E_{10} E_{12} \cup E_8 E_{10} E_{12} \cup E_5 E_{10} E_{11} \cup E_7 E_{10} E_{11} \cup E_9 E_{10} E_{11} \cup E_1 E_3 E_{10} E_{12} \cup E_2 E_3 E_{10} E_{11})$$

* 25 cut sets, 12 components

“component” reliability vs “system” reliability

➤ Component reliability analysis: $P(E_i) = P(g_i(\mathbf{X}) \leq 0) = \int_{g(\mathbf{X}) \leq 0} f_{\mathbf{X}}(\mathbf{x}) d\mathbf{x}$


- 1) FORM/SORM
- 2) Response surface method
- 3) Monte Carlo simulations
- 4) Importance samplings



➤ System reliability analysis: $P(E_{\text{system}}) = P(\bigcup \bigcap g_i(\mathbf{x}) \leq 0) = \int_{D_{\text{system}}} f_{\mathbf{X}}(\mathbf{x}) d\mathbf{x}$

- 1) Complexity
- 2) Dependence between component events
- 3) Lack of information

~ synthesize components reliabilities or perform simulations



Existing methods: (1) inclusion-exclusion formula

* Series system

$$P\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^n E_i\right) = \sum_{i=1}^n P(E_i) - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^n P(E_i E_j) + \dots + (-1)^{n-1} P(E_1 E_2 \dots E_n)$$

* Parallel system

$$P\left(\bigcap_{i=1}^n E_i\right) = 1 - P\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^n \bar{E}_i\right) = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n P(\bar{E}_i) + \dots$$


* Cut-set system

$$P\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^n C_i\right) = \sum_{i=1}^n P(C_i) - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^n P(C_i C_j) + \dots + (-1)^{n-1} P(C_1 C_2 \dots C_n)$$


- the number of terms increase exponentially; $2^n - 1$
- requires all the joint probabilities: $P(E_i)$, $P(E_i E_j)$, $P(E_i E_j E_k)$, ...
- useful only if component events are statistically independent: $P(E_i E_j) = P(E_i)P(E_j)$
~ need marginal probabilities only

** Dependence and system reliability

- A parallel system with 1~10 components with $P(E_i) = 0.01$
~ e.g. n=5: 10^{-10} (independent) $\sim 10^{-2}$ (perfectly dependent)



Existing methods: (2) simulations



$$P(E_{\text{system}}) = \int_D f_{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{x}) d\mathbf{x}$$
$$\approx \frac{\#(\mathbf{x} \in D)}{\#(\mathbf{x})}$$

~ Count the number of samples in the system failure domain and estimate the ratio.

- Monte Carlo simulations, importance sampling, directional sampling, etc.
- Independent random variables: easily generated.
- Dependent random variables: need joint probability density function
~ not available in many cases.
- Independence assumption will lead to errors in estimating system reliability

Existing methods: (3) bounding formulas

It is desirable to derive **bounds** on system probability which involve **low-order component probabilities**:

- ✓ Uni-component probabilities: $P(E_i) = P_i$
- ✓ Bi-component probabilities: $P(E_i E_j) = P_{ij}$
- ✓ Tri-component probabilities: $P(E_i E_j E_k) = P_{ijk}$

➤ Series System

1) Uni-component bounds (Boole 1854; Fréchet 1953) $\max_i P_i \leq P\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^n E_i\right) \leq \min\left(1, \sum_{i=1}^n P_i\right)$

2) Bi-component bounds (Kounias 1968; Hunter 1976; Ditlevsen 1979)

$$P_1 + \sum_{i=2}^n \max\left(0, P_i - \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} P_{ij}\right) \leq P\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^n E_i\right) \leq P_1 + \sum_{i=2}^n (P_i - \max_{j<i} P_{ij})$$

3) Tri-component bounds (Hohenbichler & Rackwitz 1983; Zhang 1993)

$$P_1 + P_2 - P_{12} + \sum_{i=3}^n \max\left(0, P_i - \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} P_{ij} + \max_{k \in \{1, 2, \dots, i-1\}} \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq k}}^{i-1} P_{ijk}\right) \leq P\left(\bigcup_{k=1}^n E_k\right) \leq P_1 + P_2 - P_{12} + \sum_{i=3}^n \left[P_i - \max_{\substack{k \in \{2, 3, \dots, i-1\} \\ j < k}} (P_{ik} + P_{ij} - P_{ijk}) \right]$$

Existing method: (3) bounding formulas (contd.)

➤ Parallel System

- Uni-component bounds (Boole 1854; Fréchet 1953)

$$\max\left(0, \sum_{i=1}^n P_i - (n - 1)\right) \leq P\left(\bigcap_{i=1}^n E_i\right) \leq \min_i P_i$$


- No higher-order bounds available.

Note: De Morgan's rule can be used to convert a parallel system to a series system, allowing use of bi- and tri-component bounding formulas for series systems.


➤ General System

- No bounding formulas exist.


Existing methods: (4) FORM approximation



Original system reliability problem




FORM analysis for each component



Integration in standard normal space

- For parallel and series system
- Find the corresponding volume in standard normal space based on FORM analyses of component events
- Errors depend on the level of nonlinearity and complexity of domain.


System reliability: challenges



- **Complexity** of system problems
 - large number of components, component states, cut sets, link sets, etc.
 - difficulty in identifying cut sets or link sets
 - computational challenges (speed and memory)


- **Dependence** between component states
 - “environmental dependence” or “common source effect”
 - members and materials by the same manufacturer or supplier
 - analysis as “independent components” is simple, but may be misleading.

- **Diversity/Lack** of available information on components
 - missing information
 - various types of information
 - should be flexible in obtaining information



II. Bounds on System Reliability by Linear Programming ('LP Bounds')

Bounds by linear programming (LP)



Probabilities of basic MECE events: $p_i \equiv P(e_i), i = 1, 2, \dots, 2^n$

1. The system failure probability

$$P(E_{\text{system}}) = \sum_{r: e_r \subseteq E_{\text{system}}} p_r = \mathbf{c}^T \mathbf{p}$$

2. Axioms of probability:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2^n} p_i = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad p_i \geq 0, \quad \forall i$$

3. Available information on component probabilities

$$P(E_i) = \sum_{r: e_r \subseteq E_i} p_r = P_i \quad (\geq P_i, \leq P_i)$$

$$P(E_i E_j) = \sum_{r: e_r \subseteq E_i E_j} p_r = P_{ij} \quad (\geq P_{ij}, \leq P_{ij}) \dots$$

minimize (maximize) $\mathbf{c}^T \mathbf{p}$


subject to $\mathbf{a}_1 \mathbf{p} = \mathbf{b}_1$

$\mathbf{a}_2 \mathbf{p} \geq \mathbf{b}_2$

Linear Programming Problem

* Song, J., and A. Der Kiureghian (2003). Bounds on system reliability by linear programming. *Journal of Engineering Mechanics*, ASCE, 129(6): 627-636.


Merits of LP approach



- ✓ Bounds for general systems.
- ✓ Any type of information on component probabilities can be used.
 - Equality: $P_{ij} = 0.02$
 - Inequality: $P_{ij} \leq 0.01$, $0.05 \leq P_i \leq 0.07$, $P_3 \leq P_2$
 - Partial: $P_1 = 0.01$, $P_2 = ?$, $P_3 = 0.03$
- ✓ Finds the *narrowest* possible bounds for the given information.
(This is not guaranteed for existing formulas for series systems involving bi- or higher-order component probabilities.)
- ✓ Can be used to compute importance and sensitivity measures, and updated system reliability.

Application to structural system reliability


Statically determinate truss (series system)




$$E_{\text{system}} = \bigcup_{i=1}^n E_i$$

1. Narrowest bounds
2. Incomplete set of probabilities
3. Inequality-type information


Daniels' parallel system




$$E_{\text{system}} = \bigcap_{i=1}^n E_i$$



Cantilever beam – bar (general system)




$$E_{\text{system}} = E_1 E_2 \cup E_3 E_4 \cup E_3 E_5$$



* Song, J., and A. Der Kiureghian (2003). Bounds on system reliability by linear programming. *Journal of Engineering Mechanics*, ASCE, 129(6): 627-636.

Application to electrical substation systems

- Component failure event, E_i



Two-transmission-line substations

$$E_i = \{\ln R_i - \ln A - \ln S_i \leq 0\}, i = 1, \dots, n$$

$A = \text{LN}(\text{mean}=0.15, \text{c.o.v.}=0.5)$ PGA

$S_i = \text{LN}(\text{mean}=1, \text{c.o.v.}=0.2)$ local site effect

$R_i = \text{LN}(\text{mean}, \text{c.o.v.}, \text{corr.})$ equipment capacity

DS: Disconnect Switch (0.4, 0.3, 0.3)

CB: Circuit Breaker (0.3, 0.3, 0.3)

PT: Power Transformer (0.5, 0.5, 0.5)

DB: Drawout Breaker (0.4, 0.3, 0.3)


TB: Tie Breaker (1.0, 0.3, 0.3)

FB: Feeder Breaker (1.0, 0.3, 0.3)

Case	Uni-comp.	Bi-comp.	Tri-comp.	M.C. $\delta=0.01$
As shown in figure	$1.13 \times 10^{-12} \sim 0.202$	$0.0436 \sim 0.146$	$0.0616 \sim 0.0942$	0.0752
No information available on TB (E_{10})	$1.82 \times 10^{-11} \sim 0.202$	$0.0436 \sim 0.146$	$0.0615 \sim 0.0943$	N/A
No information available on CB_1 (E_4)	$1.26 \times 10^{-9} \sim 0.202$	$0.0267 \sim 0.147$	$0.0395 \sim 0.1360$	N/A
Upper bound available on CB_1 , $P_4 \leq 0.01$	$5.19 \times 10^{-9} \sim 0.120$	$0.0267 \sim 0.0995$	$0.0395 \sim 0.0701$	N/A

* Song, J., and A. Der Kiureghian (2003). Bounds on system reliability by linear programming and applications to electrical substations. *Proc. of ICASP9*, San Francisco, USA, July 6-9.

Multi-scale system reliability analysis



System of four electrical substations

($n = 59$: 5.76×10^{17} design variables)


➤ System decomposition

- consider a subset of the components of a system as “super-components”
- bounds on marginal and joint probabilities of the super-components are computed by LP approach
- the computed bounds are used as constraints in solving the LP problem for the entire system
- reduced to 35 LP problems, the largest of which has $2^{15} = 32,768$ variables

➤ multi-scale system modeling

- helps the analyst see the “big picture,” while not disregarding system details
- particularly effective when many similar subsystems exist
- allows different teams of analysts to work on different subsystems (parallel computing)

System reliability updating




- In the analysis of system reliability, it is often of interest to compute the **conditional probability** of a system or subsystem event, given that another system or subsystem event is known or presumed to have occurred.

❖ Examples: $P(E_i | E_{system})$, $P(E_i | \bar{E}_{system})$, etc.


$$P(B | A) = \frac{P(AB)}{P(A)} = \frac{\sum_{r \in AB} P_r}{\sum_{r \in A} P_r} \sim \text{Nonlinear function of } \mathbf{p}'\text{s}$$

- The bounds on the conditional probabilities can be obtained after a few iterations of a parameterized LP problem (Dinkelbach 1967).



* Der Kiureghian, A. and J. Song (2008). Multi-scale reliability analysis and updating of complex systems by use of linear programming. *Journal of Reliability Engineering & System Safety*, 93(2): 288-297.

System reliability updating (contd.)



Updated failure probabilities of equipment items in Substation 4

Type	Equipment No.	$P(E_i)$	$P(E_i E_{sys})$	$P(E_i \bar{E}_{sys})$
DS	56, 58, 62, 64	0.00371	0.243 ~ 0.375	0.000431 ~ 0.00125
	59, 61, 65, 67	0.00371	0.175 ~ 0.372	0.000431 ~ 0.00182
	68	0.00371	0.331 ~ 0.468	0
CB	57, 63	0.00953	0.506 ~ 0.660	0.00345 ~ 0.00458
	60, 66	0.00953	0.338 ~ 0.623	0.00357 ~ 0.00613
PT	69	0.00232	0.206 ~ 0.292	0

Identification of critical components and cut sets







- LP approach can identify components and cut sets which make **significant contributions** to the system failure probability by iteratively solving parameterized LP's.

- **Importance Measures (IM)**

quantifies **participation** in system failure probability

- Fussell-Vesely:
$$FV_i = P\left(\bigcup_{k:E_i \subseteq C_k} C_k\right) / P(E_{system})$$
- Risk Achievement Worth:
$$RAW_i = P(E_{system}^{(i)}) / P(E_{system})$$
- Risk Reduction Worth:
$$RRW_i = P(E_{system}) / P(\overline{E_{system}^{(i)}})$$
- Boundary Probability:
$$BP_i = P(E_{system}^{(i)}) - P(\overline{E_{system}^{(i)}})$$
- Fussell-Vesely Cutset IM:
$$FVC_k = P(C_k) / P(E_{system})$$


Identification of critical components and cut sets (contd.)



* Song, J. and A. Der Kiureghian. Component importance measures by linear programming bounds on system reliability. *Proc. of ICOSSAR9, Rome, Italy, June 19-23.*

Sensitivity and optimal upgrade

- General-purpose LP algorithms provide the sensitivity of an optimal solution with respect to the values in the right-hand side vector, \mathbf{b} .



- **Optimal upgrade** of system reliability within the limit of upgrade cost (*in progress*)

$$\begin{aligned} &\min_{\mathbf{x}} \max_{\mathbf{p}} \mathbf{c}^T \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}) \\ &\text{subject to } \mathbf{a}_1 \mathbf{p} = \mathbf{b}_1(\mathbf{x}), \quad \mathbf{a}_2 \mathbf{p} \geq \mathbf{b}_2(\mathbf{x}) \\ &\quad \mathbf{Q}\mathbf{x} \leq \mathbf{q}, \quad \mathbf{m}^T \mathbf{x} \leq m_c \\ &\quad \mathbf{x} : \text{binary integers} \end{aligned}$$

~ minimize the upper bound of P_{sys}

~ component failure probabilities: $f(\text{actions})$

~ constraints on the actions (workability, cost)

~ indicators for upgrade actions (1: yes, 0: no)

LP Bounds approach and decision-making

minimize (maximize) $\mathbf{c}^T \mathbf{p}$
subject to $\mathbf{a}_1 \mathbf{p} = \mathbf{b}_1$
 $\mathbf{a}_2 \mathbf{p} \geq \mathbf{b}_2$

LP Bounds Approach

System Reliability

consequence-based engrg.
Life-cycle cost analysis

**Identification of
Critical Components
and Cut sets**

Priority in upgrade project
(cost limit not considered)

**System Reliability
Updating**


Strategy for post-hazard
inspection/ recovery

**Sensitivity of
System Reliability**

Plan for optimal upgrade
(cost limit considered)

457.646 Topics in Structural Reliability
In-Class Material: Class 16

◎ General system by cut set formulation



E_{sys} : cannot travel from A to B

- ① Cut set: a subset of components whose joint _____ constitutes the _____ of the system

$$C = \{ \quad \quad \quad \}$$

$$E_{sys} =$$

- ② "Minimum" cut sets ~ cut sets with no r_____ components

$$C = \{ \quad \quad \quad \}$$

$$E_{sys} =$$


⇒ cut sets which cease to be a cut set if any of the components is _____

- ③ "Disjoint" cut sets $P(E_{sys}) = P(\cup C_k) = \sum P(C_k)$

$$C_{disj} = \{ \quad \quad \quad \}$$

$$= \{ \quad \quad \quad \}$$

$$E_{sys} = E_1 \cup \bar{E}_1 E_2 E_3$$




★

$$E_{sys} = \bigcup_{k=1}^{Ncut} C_k$$

$$= \bigcup_{k=1}^{Ncut} \bigcap_{i \in C_k} E_i$$

	1	2	3	
○	○	○	○	$\bar{E}_1 \cdot \bar{E}_2 \cdot \bar{E}_3$
○	○	X	○	$\bar{E}_1 \cdot \bar{E}_2 \cdot E_3$
○	X	○	○	$\bar{E}_1 \cdot E_2 \cdot \bar{E}_3$
X	○	○	○	$E_1 \cdot \bar{E}_2 \cdot \bar{E}_3$
	⋮			⋮
	⋮			⋮

◎ General system by link set formulation



① Link set: a subset of components whose joint () assures () of the system

$$L = \{ \quad \quad \quad \}$$

② “Minimum” link sets ~ link sets with no r_____ component

$$L_{\min} = \{ \quad \quad \quad \}$$

③ “Disjoint” Link set

$$L_{disj} = \{ \quad \quad \quad \}$$

$$\star \bar{E}_{sys} = \bigcup_{k=1}^{Nlink} L_k = \bigcup_{k=1}^{Nlink} \left(\bigcap_{i=L_k} \bar{E}_i \right)$$

De morgan’s law

$$\therefore E_{sys} = \bigcap_{k=1}^{Nlink} \left(\bigcup_{i=L_k} \right)$$